Introduction
The past decade has seen a growing debate regarding the extent to which international treaties should include provisions protecting transnational investment, and especially provisions allowing foreign investors to resort to international adjudication against states -referred to as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions. The question entered the spotlight originally in connection with the negotiations of two major 'mega-regional' economic agreements. One was the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), now replaced with the 11-party Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), signed on 8 March 2018,1 and the other the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), a proposed comprehensive economic agreement between the European Union (EU) and the United States. These two agreements, which originally would have covered countries that account for around 55% of global output, were not exclusively international investment agreements (IIAs), nor were they merely preferential trade agreements (PTAs) providing for reciprocal elimination of tariff barriers. They, and the megaregionals that succeeded them, embodied a much broader agenda of liberalization and integration, establishing a comprehensive regulation of economic matters and dealing with issues ranging from regulatory coherence to labour and environment standards to services and government procurement. Much controversy has surrounded the inclusion in trade agreements of investment chapters which permit ISDS. Whereas the number of treaties featuring ISDS has increased exponentially over the past two decades, their popularity has been accompanied by growing controversy over the relinquishment by states of ultimate authority over the legal rights of foreign investors. 
2.1
The Development of the Investment Regime One of the most controversial issues in recent negotiations of economic agreements is whether to add to such treaties rules governing treatment of foreign investment and dispute settlement systems to enforce them. Investment protection, which in the 19th and early 20th centuries was effected through intervention of the home state of the investor -often involving the use of force3 -evolved over the 20th century towards peaceful negotiation and adjudication. Within this framework, the late 20th century saw the development of ISDS, a powerful institutional arrangement aimed at preventing disputes regarding private investments from devolving into inter-state conflicts.
International investment law is unique in its architecture. Neither the substantive law on investment nor the procedural rules relating to dispute settlement are provided for in a single multilateral treaty. Whereas the large number of IIAs allows one to speak of a multilateral legal regime,4 this regime is grounded on a 'myriad of bilateral, regional, and sectoral investment treaties' .5 IIAs provide for substantive obligations, but do not themselves establish an institutional structure. Instead, they usually direct investors to resort to ISDS against host states under pre-existing arbitration frameworks such as those provided by the World Bank's International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the United Nations Conference on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).
Starting with a 1959 treaty between Germany and Pakistan, ISDS provisions were initially included in bilateral investment treaties (BITs) dealing exclusively with the rights of investors. Subsequently, beginning with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),6 negotiators of preferential trade agreements started adding to the text of PTAs an investment chapter, which often permitted recourse to ISDS by nationals of one party holding investment in another party. Since the NAFTA, the network of IIAs and PTAs featuring ISDS grew exponentially over the 1990s, and kept on expanding in the 21st century.7 This expansion of investment law was accompanied by qualitative developments. Originally, BIT were signed mainly between developed, capitalexporting countries on the one hand, and developing, capital-importing countries on the other hand. Whereas the provisions in BITs formally applied equally to both parties, the distinct factual situations of the two parties made these treaties highly asymmetric in practice. The result was a regime often portrayed as 'neo-colonial' ,8 or as marked by the 'dynamics of imperialism' ,9 with the developing 'host' state accepting limitations on its conduct in order to induce investments originating from individuals and companies from the developed, capital-exporting country 'home' state.
By the late 2000s, this situation had changed. The development of a vast network of IIAs and PTAs with investment provisions, many of which involved more than one capital-exporting country, meant that developed countries could now foreseeably be targeted by ISDS complaints from investors from other capital-exporting countries.10 Coupled with the changing dynamics of capital flows, in which nationals of traditionally capital-importing countries increasingly hold investments in traditionally capital-exporting countries,11 this evolution resulted in changes to some assumptions about the role fulfilled by the different states within the investment regime.
In parallel, and particularly following the use of ISDS to challenge policies enacted by developed countries,12 a heightened awareness arose that ISDS could be employed to challenge not only outright expropriation but also policies enacted in the pursuit of non-economic objectives.13 Concerns were thus raised that ISDS might be used to prevent the realization of a 'global' public interest, enshrined in other international conventions.14
2.2
The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration In terms of substantive rules, IIAs establish a series of duties for states parties with regard to investors from the other party. Traditionally, IIAs were vague as regards the substantive obligations of states, referring to general concepts such as prohibition of 'denial of justice' and a duty to grant investors 'fair and equitable treatment' . The concrete content of these concepts was developed in a multitude of declarations, resolutions of international organizations, international judicial decisions, and (increasingly) arbitral awards. Crucially, most IIAs contain a most-favored-nation (MFN) clause establishing for both parties the obligation to grant to investors from the other party treatment no less favorable than that granted to investors of third states.
The combination of compulsory arbitration and ambiguous substantive provisions led investment tribunals to increasingly rely on previous arbitral decisions for guidance as regards legal interpretation of the scope and content of the obligations set forth in IIAs. Additionally, MFN clauses have been interpreted by a number of tribunals as permitting the 'import' into a BIT of a provision in another BIT, signed between the host state and a third state, as long as the investor finds this other provision to be 'more favorable' to its case than the relevant provision in the BIT endowing the tribunal with jurisdiction.15 Some tribunals have gone as far as to importing the very provision endowing them with jurisdiction.16 The number of claims has skyrocketed. Whereas between 1996 and 2000 investors started an average of 10 cases a year, this average increased to over 30 cases a year between 2006 and 2010, and almost 60 cases a year between 2011 and 2015.17
Here again, besides the absolute increase in the number of cases, a qualitative change has occurred, in the sense that developed countries, which traditionally did not host investments from their counterparts in BITs, found their own policies subject to challenge through ISDS. The two treaties that provided the basis for the largest number of investment arbitrations -the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), with 97 cases, and NAFTA, with 77 cases -both involve more than one developed country, with the result that a number of arbitrations have been brought by investors against these traditionally capitalexporting countries. The most frequent target of ISDS under the ECT has been Spain, with 31 cases started against it. This contrasts with seven cases started against Poland, six against Italy, Russia and Turkey, five against Hungary and 19 This wave of litigation has heightened a perception that there are structural imbalances in BITs and ISDS provides foreign investors with an unfair advantage, providing them with access to arbitral tribunals that prioritize their private interests over the public interests of the host state -and sometimes awarding large sums of money from public funds with no oversight by domestic courts.20 According to critics, proponents of ISDS consider it as 'simply a system of private ordering' , a form of contractual dispute resolution needed to ensure balance in the bilateral relationship between investors and host states, Instead, they argue, the impact of ISDS is such that it should in fact be arranged as 'part of a comprehensive governance system meant to ensure justice and the rule of law in one aspect of international economic relations' . 21 The view that investors were abusing the protection offered by ISDS led to a 'backlash'22 against it, and to attempts to find a better balance between preserving investors' rights and the state's right to regulate.
Between 2003 and 2010, resistance to investment arbitration was limited to states perceived as challengers of the post-Cold War global economic order. States such as Bolivia, Venezuela, Russia, and Ecuador not only voiced concerns with the system but followed up by withdrawing from treaties permitting ISDS.23 Subsequently, these states were joined by a number of developed This perception of the functions of ISDS is, of course, an academic construct, and is not necessarily shared by investment tribunals themselves. Instead, many of these tribunals seem to ascribe to a narrower view under which ISDS is simply a means of settling a dispute between two parties.34 Pursuant to this view, the fact that one of the parties to a dispute happens to be a state does not change its essentially private nature. As a consequence, the perceived aim of dispute resolution becomes to give effect to the agreement between the parties, and to enforce commitments rather than to actively take into account public interest considerations. In fact, from this perspective, enforcing commitments is the realization of public interest, in the sense that it guarantees property rights and makes promises credible, allowing private actors to allocate resources in the most efficient way. 35 Despite resistance from many corners, including a number of practitioners in investment arbitration,36 this change of perspective regarding the role of ISDS has now been accepted by a number of governments. It is partly at the The modifications to CETA reflect the EU's response to internal criticism of ISDS and embody a proposal for an alternative dispute settlement regime. This alternative was integrated in the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement41 and is also being pursued in the context of TTIP negotiations (in the latter case, with seemingly less chances of success). Its central aim is to depart from the ad hoc ISDS adjudication largely found in BITs to date and create a permanent investment adjudication system, including an appeals mechanism similar to that found in the WTO. In announcing its Proposal for a Council Decision on CETA, the European Commission described this 'new investment court system' as an important first step 'towards the EU's ultimate goal of a global investment court' .42 Both the EU's proposal and India's Model BIT, discussed below, aim to reform ISDS by making it more judicialized, foreseeing the establishment of a standing adjudicatory body as well as avenues for pursuing appellate review in ISDS disputes. Brazil's CIFAs focus on a less judicialized alternative. With these agreements Brazil, a large developing economy (and one of the few states that remained outside the ISDS-dominated investment legal regime) appears to pursue a different route from the one set out in the EU's TTIP proposal and in the India Model BIT. Brazil's reasons for not adhering to the ISDS-dominated investment regime are twofold. First, there were doubts regarding constitutional barriers to the submission of the Brazilian state to investment arbitration.45 Second, the country was able to maintain its attractiveness to investment by means that did not bind it to ISDS. Indeed, Brazil consistently ranks among the top 10 recipients of foreign direct investment (FDI) worldwide. Even in the crisis years of 2014 and 2015, Brazil ranked 4th worldwide among FDI recipients.46 At least for a country with the characteristics of Brazil, it appears that IIAs are not determinant for attracting FDI.
Brazil's absence from the international investment law regime does not mean foreign investors are not safeguarded in the country. Especially since the enactment of an arbitration law in 1996, contractual arbitration has increasingly been used as a means of dispute resolution in state contracts. A number of decisions of the Brazilian higher courts have confirmed the legality of arbitral clauses in state contracts and the enforceability of arbitral awards against the state.47 As regards the international investment regime, however, Brazil's position has remained that of an attentive bystander.
This, however, changed significantly in 2015, when Brazil signed six CIFAs with Mozambique, Angola, Malawi, Mexico, Colombia, and Chile. In 2016, Brazil signed a broader agreement with Peru -the 'Economic and Trade Expansion Agreement' -featuring similar provisions with regard to investment. Brazil has described the goal of CIFAs as 'to create incentives for reciprocal investment through intergovernmental dialogue mechanisms' , with the aim of establishing rights and obligations for investors and states alike and to provide an alternative institutional model for prevention and settlement of disputes.
This shift in policy had its roots in factual developments. As its economy evolved over the past 25 years, Brazil multiplied its outward increasingly became a source of FDI, directed especially to countries in South America and Africa. This reignited the public debate concerning the importance of providing a framework to regulate the relationship between foreign investors and government.49 Overcoming Brazil's traditional resistance to IIAs, CIFAs create a new regime for the protection of FDI, excluding ISDS and instead setting out a hybrid system of dispute prevention mechanisms and state-to-state arbitration. CIFAs establish a legal framework for the home government of investors to defend the interests of its nationals, negotiating directly with, or starting arbitral proceedings against, the government of the host state. Arbitration is explicitly aimed at ensuring compliance rather than providing investors with compensation for breach.
Among the distinctive features of CIFAs when compared to other IIAs is the attempt to establish substantive obligations for investors, institutionalizing efforts to ensure corporate social responsibility. CIFAs set forth a general "best efforts" obligation, addressed at investors, to contribute to the extent possible with the 'sustainable development of the Host Country by adopting a high degree of measures of corporate social responsibility' .50 Some CIFAs define such practices, along the lines of directives established by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),51 establishing general guidelines and standards for investment decisions, ranging from protecting the environment and human rights to respecting local political processes to 'abstaining from seeking or accepting exemptions not established in the laws of the host state' .52
The biggest difference between CIFAs and most contemporary IIAs, however, is that CIFAs do not feature ISDS. Rather, they establish a number of institutions and procedures aimed at preventing differences from escalating into litigious disputes. establishment of two different institutions: one 'Focal Point' or 'ombudsman' for each party,53 and one Joint Committee. Focal Points are domestic governmental institutions of the parties, whereas the Joint Committee is a political decision-making treaty organ, composed of both parties to the treaty acting jointly and responsible for administering the relevant agreement.54
Focal Points are governmental instruments that must act to ensure proper implementation of CIFAs, serving as points of first contact for foreign investors in the host state. They give investors support and hear their complaints, with the aim of preventing the emergence of formal disputes between investors and host states. Contact points of the parties to a CIFA must also be in touch with each other and apply directives issued by the Joint Committee.55
The creation of CIFA focal points is inspired by the positive experience of South Korea with an investment ombudsman. South Korea's Office of the Foreign Investment Ombudsman (OFIO) provides post-investment services for foreign investors and on-site consultations regarding issues of finance, taxation, accounting, intellectual property rights, construction issues and labour issues. OFIO hears grievances brought to it by foreign investors, and is empowered to contact ministers and high-level governmental authorities directly in order to solve grievances, not only dealing with specific issues but also proposing systemic improvements and legal changes. OFIO has received on average 400 cases a year since its creation in 1999. The resolution rate, initially at 25%, now consistently reaches over 90% (2007-2011 data) .56 OFIO is widely recognized as the entity responsible for the virtual absence of ISDS claims filed against Korea (only one, for around 90 treaties in force featuring ISDS). 57 One salient aspect that distinguishes CIFA dispute prevention is that not only investors but also governments can engage with the Focal Points when disagreements arise over an investment relationship. By allowing for government participation, CIFAs also provide host governments with a forum to express grievances against investor behavior. This option is in fact one of the elements currently being debated in the international investment regime reform, given that corruption practices and environmental damage may be left unpunished as the result of a state's inability to sue investors under IIAs.58
In order to avoid resort to adjudication when Focal Points are unsuccessful, CIFAs also require that 'questions of specific interest to an investor' be referred to the Joint Committee prior to the initiation of disputes. The Joint Committee must examine the dispute; hear the parties, as well as the investor and the governmental and non-governmental entities involved in the dispute; and issue a public report, which describes the dispute and the positions of the parties.59 Joint Committees, also seen in other international agreements,60 play an important institutional role in CIFAs. They provide a further avenue for resolving potential conflicts without recourse to litigation.
The large role entrusted to Joint Committees and Focal Points is evidence of the perspective that underlies CIFAs: providing institutions and instruments for inter-state cooperation, bringing an element of diplomacy to the investment protection regime.
3.2.2
Dispute Settlement: 'African' versus 'Latin American' Treaties In case the parties are unable to resolve their differences through consultations mediated by the Joint Committee, a distinction appears between two 'types' of CIFAs. The three 'African' CIFAs make dispute settlement fully optional, merely allowing for state-to-state arbitration if both states parties agree thereto. By contrast, the four 'Latin American' CIFAs contain arbitral clauses, empowering either party to unilaterally initiate arbitration proceedings against the other party.
Thus, the Brazil-Angola CIFA establishes that, in case the dispute cannot be settled through negotiations or by a recommendation from the Joint Committee, the parties 'may have recourse to state-to-state arbitration mechanisms' ,61 which means that arbitration would require a new agreement between the two states parties. Under the Brazil-Mozambique and Brazil-Malawi CIFAs, disputes not settled by agreement may be submitted to arbitration ' whenever deemed convenient by the parties' .62 These treaties refer to state-to-state arbitration mechanisms 'to be established by the Joint Committee' . Although the wording of the provision does not appear to preclude the subsequent establishment of mechanisms in which arbitration is compulsory, this would seem to require a new agreement between the parties.63
By contrast, the 'Latin American' CIFAs feature enforeable dispute settlement provisions, and establish a two-stage process. At the first stage, the Joint Committee must be formally seized with the dispute; it is given a 60-day period of time to issue a report on the matter. If this does not solve the dispute, either party may unilaterally request arbitration, conducted (in the absence of agreement between the parties to take the dispute to an institutional mechanism) before an ad hoc arbitral tribunal.
Importantly, a fall-back mechanism is available to prevent parties from frustrating the dispute settlement procedure by failing to appoint arbitrators. In case the parties fail to appoint members to the tribunal or in case the partyappointed arbitrators fail to jointly appoint a chair within specified deadlines, these appointments are to be made by an international institution. In the Brazil-Mexico and Brazil-Peru CIFAs, the appointing authority is the President of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).64 In the Brazil-Colombia and BrazilChile CIFAs, it is the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).65 62 Brazil-Mozambique CIFA, art 15(6); Brazil-Malawi CIFA, art 13(6). 63 Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Brauch (n 58) 11 make the point that the Brazil-Angola CIFA contains a most-favoured-nation (MFN) provision in Article 11(7), requiring MFN treatment with regard to 'access to courts of justice and administrative agencies, or to the defence of the rights of such investors' . This provision, they argue, could be interpreted as allowing investors access to ISDS in case one of the parties grants this access to investors in third states. 64 Brazil-Mexico CIFA, art 14(4)-14(6); Brazil-Peru CIFA, art 2.21(7). In case the President is a national of one of the parties or is otherwise impeded, the Vice-President is to make the appointments. In case of impediment of the Vice-President, the most senior ICJ judge not impeded is to make the appointments. 65 Brazil-Colombia CIFA, art 23(7); Brazil-Chile CIFA, Annex I, art 4(4). In case of impediment, the most ancient unimpeded member of the PCA is to make the appointments. 
4.1
The WTO-Inspired CIFA Adjudication Provisions The CIFAs that do establish compulsory arbitration mechanisms appear to draw heavily on the language of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). Article 3 of Annex I of the Brazil-Chile CIFA, which sets out the terms of reference of arbitral tribunals, describes them as:
To examine, in an objective manner and in light of the relevant provisions of this agreement, the matter referred in the request for establishment of the arbitral tribunal, and to make findings of fact and law, making a motivated determination of whether or not the measure in question is in conformity with the Agreement.
This language echoes Article 7.1 of the DSU, which establishes as the standard terms of reference for WTO panels '[t]o examine, in the light of the relevant provisions …, the matter referred' to WTO adjudication. Article 11 DSU adds that that 'a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements' . Finally, Article 12.7 DSU provides that 'the report of panel shall set out the findings of fact, the applicability of the relevant provisions and the basic rationale behind any findings and recommendations that it makes' .
Besides drawing language from its text, CIFAs share with WTO adjudication the purpose, declared in Article 3.7 DSU, of re-establishing compliance following a finding of inconsistency.66 The Brazil-Mexico and Brazil-Peru CIFAs state this goal explicitly, whereas the Brazil-Chile and Brazil-Colombia CIFAs use slightly different wording, providing that the goal of arbitration is to determine compliance with CIFA rules.67 The Brazil-Mexico CIFA derives from this goal an inability of arbitrators to award damages:
The goal of arbitration is to put in conformity with this agreement any measure declared in the arbitral award not to conform to it. The parties 66 In the relevant part, DSU, art 3.7 reads: 'the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agreements' . 67 Brazil-Chile CIFA, Annex I, art 3; Brazil-Colombia CIFA, art 23 may notwithstanding agree that the arbitrators consider the existence of damages caused by the challenged measure and establish in the award compensation for these damages. If the award does determine monetary compensation, the party that receives this compensation must transfer it to the owners of the rights over the investment in question, after deducting the costs of litigation, following the domestic procedure of each party.68
This wording contrasts two distinct and, it would seem, alternative remedies available following a finding of breach. One is a formal declaration of the obligation to put into conformity with the agreement a measure found to be CIFAinconsistent. The other, subject to the agreement of the (states) parties, is the possibility of an award requiring payment of compensation for damages. The same result arises from the provision in the Brazil-Colombia CIFA precluding arbitral tribunals from awarding an indemnity for damages unless the parties sign a specific agreement to this effect.69 These provisions reverse the traditional focus of investment tribunals on compensation awards. Compensation is perceived as useful in that it allows tribunals not to intervene in sovereign decisions, providing remedies to investors without requiring states to modify their conduct. From the viewpoint of a good-faith government, however, a monetary award means that an investor will leave the country with taxpayers' money and cease performing its function of generating economic value.70 Depending on the amount of the award and on the government's budget, paying compensation may require significant reductions in public investments and governmental programs.
Additionally, the stated aim of not interfering with sovereignty does not take into account that, when amounts are high enough, monetary remedies do constitute a significant deterrent to conduct. Even if tribunals may recognize the right of the host state to 'exercise … normal regulatory power in the pursuance of a public interest' ,71 the mere possibility of having to deal with potentially costly ISDS claims could lead a government to refrain from adopting important policies because of their consequential impacts on foreign investors -an effect commonly referred to as 'regulatory chill' .72 In this regard, CIFAs appear to assume that governments would in principle prefer investors to stay and aim to facilitate mutually satisfactory solutions that enable them to do so, rather than compensate aggrieved investors. While only the Brazil-Colombia and Brazil-Mexico CIFAs are explicit regarding the limitation on compensation awards, remedy provisions in the other two Latin American CIFAs appear to share this assumption. The Brazil-Peru CIFA declares that the objective of arbitration is to re-establish conformity with the rules of the relevant agreement,73 while the Brazil-Chile CIFA provides (in wording that also appear in the Brazil-Colombia CIFA) that the goal of arbitration is to determine the conformity of measures taken by one of the parties with the Agreement, and that parties must 'comply with [the award] without delay' .74 Article 9 of the Brazil-Chile CIFA goes on to state that the respondent party must 'comply with the award immediately, or, in case this is not possible, within a reasonable period of time' -another term drawn from WTO law.75
The Brazil-Chile76 and Brazil-Colombia77 CIFAs empower tribunals solely to establish whether or not a challenged conduct violates CIFA rules -and not to derive any consequences from this finding. The result is that, in arbitrations under these CIFAs, the parties are under the obligation to 'comply' with an award which, pursuant to a purely textual interpretation, cannot prescribe any specific conduct but only determine whether the challenged conduct was lawful.
4.2
Determining Remedies in CIFA Arbitration Given the vagueness of remedy provisions in CIFAs, tribunals will be required to determine the extent of their power to award remedies. In this case, the question would be the extent to which these conditions involve the payment of reparation for injury caused by the conduct the tribunal found to be unlawful. In Chorzów Factory, the PCIJ stated:
It is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form. Reparation therefore is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself.79
Following the PCIJ, a number of other international adjudicators have inferred from their adjudicatory functions the power to award monetary remedies.80 As a matter of general international law, this view is now reflected in the rules codified in the International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility, which recognize as core legal consequences of any violation the obligations of cessation and reparation. The former requires a state to cease all unlawful conduct following a determination that it is unlawful,81 whereas the latter requires the wrongdoer to reverse, or compensate, any harmful effects caused to others by its wrongful conduct. Article 31(1) of the Articles codifies the duty of reparation, providing that a wrongdoing state has 'an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act' .82 On the other hand, the fact that CIFAs draw so heavily on WTO law could lead tribunals to exercise restraint with regard to performance remedies and issue solely WTO-inspired ruling requiring that party found in breach 'bring the measure into conformity' .83 In this case, the question concerns the extent to which the inspiration drawn from the WTO means that a party found to have violated its obligations under a CIFA may provide redress for its past conduct simply by changing this conduct for the future, i.e. prospectively, ceasing, revoking or modifying for the future (ex nunc) the measure found to contravene its obligations.
In WTO law, the notion that WTO remedies are 'prospective' was initially a contentious one. The prevailing interpretation, based on the practice of a vast majority of GATT panels, is that any injury caused by the wrongful measure can remain uncompensated, without any legal consequences for the Member found in violation of its obligations.84 The Appellate Body has described the remedies provided for in the WTO Agreements as 'prospective in nature' .85 On the other hand, Article 3.7 of the DSU refers to the 'withdrawal' of measures found to be inconsistent with WTO rules, which -in conjunction with the rules of general international law on reparation -could provide a basis for the view that 'bring[ing] the measure into conformity' requires both revoking the measure and reversing its effects.
Some early WTO panels considered that, in at least some cases, remedies provisions should be interpreted as requiring Members to reverse the effects of their WTO-inconsistent conduct.86 However, the Appellate Body has concluded that, since WTO Members are allowed a reasonable period of time to comply with reports, 'the WTO-inconsistency has to cease by the end of the reasonable period of time with prospective effect' .87 In US-Zeroing ( Japan) (Article 21.5 -Japan), the Appellate Body further explained that 'the reasonable period of time allows a Member sufficient time to bring itself into conformity with its WTO obligations without being required to provide compensation or being subject to the suspension of concessions or other obligations' .88
The import of prospective remedies from the trade framework into the investment framework has a certain appeal. Precluding monetary awards prevents the sanctioning of wrongful acts of specific governments from impacting public finances and causing long-lasting damages on the ability of the state to exercise its basic functions.89 On the other hand, one may wonder whether a purely prospective remedy is an appropriate response to the kind of measure that is most commonly the subject of investment disputes.
4.3
CIFA Remedy Provisions and General International Law Prospective remedies are arguably well-suited to WTO disputes, which tend to involve policies affecting entire industries and economic sectors rather than violations that affect a specific economic agent. Disputes brought before investor-state arbitral tribunals, on the other hand, tend to concern individual claims of injury, loss of an investment or nullification of an investment. This is related to the different concrete situations of an exporter and of an investor. A producer in state A that faces an unlawful trade barrier in state B may be satisfied to see the unlawful barrier withdrawn, and to increase its sales to state B. Although the producer will have lost profits (due to less volume of sales, lower prices, or both) for the period of time the inconsistent conduct lasted, it is not unreasonable to consider that this producer will attach significant value to the prospect of future sales. By contrast, a breach of an investment agreement often involves the expropriation of an investment, unlawfully or without adequate compensation, or measures that result in the loss, de jure or de facto, of the value of the investment. An investor from state A who loses its investment in state B due to a law that expropriates all foreign investments in a certain field -or its investment in particular -may find little advantage in obtaining, at the end of the arbitration procedure, a revocation of that law that operates solely for the future.
If the compliance obligation in CIFAs is interpreted like its equivalent in WTO law, an award finding a violation would only entail an obligation for an offender to bring itself into conformity and cease its CIFA-inconsistent conduct with prospective effect. The state found in breach would be able to fully comply with the award by revoking the relevant measure ex nunc (in the case of a breach that is not a policy but an act, it could simply not repeat the act). The legal situations and transfers of property generated by the measure would be fully preserved.
This interpretation would produce three effects. First, it would nullify a number of substantive provisions in CIFAs, making expropriation without compensation de facto permissible when carried out through a one-time measure whose effects could later on be considered as crystallized in the past. Second, it could generate a perverse incentive for governments attempting to extract rent from foreign investors: whereas a measure that aims to extract rent over time (e.g., higher taxes) is subject to a CIFA remedy, a one-time taking would be protected from remedies. Third, this interpretation would make CIFA arbitration unattractive compared to other forms of protection of investment.
Competition from other forms of dispute resolution is particularly significant. If CIFA tribunals are only empowered to award limited remedies and a different international tribunal has jurisdiction over the dispute (which is the case for the ICJ between some CIFA parties),90 an investor would probably find it more attractive to convince its home state to take the dispute to the adjudicator from which it can get an effective remedy -compensation or retrospective restitution -rather than to CIFA arbitration. Alternatively, investors may prefer to make sure they are more effectively protected by contractual arbitration. The usual confidentiality of contractual arbitration would mean that arbitral tribunals could still be established and award compensation, without the transparency that usually accompanies state-to-state arbitrations, and that is increasingly required in investor-state arbitration.91
4.4
Making Compliance Remedies Work for Investment: 'Retrospective Compliance' The potential inadequacy of using a WTO-like interpretation for remedies in the investment context may lead CIFA tribunals to adopt the same interpretation as some early WTO panels, pursuant to which full compliance requires not only prospective withdrawal or modification of an unlawful measure (compliance ex nunc) but also retrospective offsetting of the injury caused by the measure (compliance ex tunc).92 This could be done by undoing unlawful acts, transferring back property or rights unlawfully expropriated, or providing monetary compensation for the corresponding injury.
Read in this light, the provisions in the Brazil-Mexico and Brazil-Colombia CIFAs requiring agreement of the parties for compensation do not affect the duty of reparation, which arises by the mere fact of the violation. Rather, these provisions ensure the primacy in practice of the remedy of restitution over that of compensation. Whereas restitution has generally been affirmed by courts and arbitral tribunals as the primary remedy for violations, adjudicators often affirm this in principle, only to conclude that restitution is impracticable or undesirable and award compensation (i.e. damages). 93 In arbitration taking place under these CIFAs, only the parties -i.e., the states parties -are able to decide that the remedy of restitution is undesirable and that compensation is the appropriate remedy. In other cases, tribunals that decide to apply the rule In all of these cases, however, the arbitral tribunals made sure to establish a compensation-based enforcement mechanism as an alternative in case the offending state did not restore the claimant's rights. Under the Brazil-Colombia and Brazil-Mexico CIFAs, on the other hand, tribunals seem to have their hands tied in this regard. The decision to provide compensation as an alternative to restitution depends on the acceptability of the monetary remedy both to the wrongdoer and to the claimant state. While it is not impossible for ex post agreements allowing compensation to become commonplace, an offending state may prefer to hold its ground, and modify its conduct only marginally, rather than agree to provide compensation. Under a strict interpretation of their mandates, tribunals acting under the Brazil-Colombia and Brazil-Mexico CIFAs may not even have the power to calculate damages that would be owed in case the parties did agree to monetary remedies.98 94 When the ICJ finds that compensation is due, it usually makes this determination in the abstract, allowing the parties the opportunity to determine for themselves the relevant amount. This is relevant both because it demonstrates that CIFA parties have resorted to international adjudication to defend economic interests of their nationals and because engaging in WTO litigation has required developing countries to build up institutions within which the public sector and the private sector can cooperate.123 Once this institutional structure is in place, it becomes more likely that governments will be aware of issues of concern to their local industries, and that industries will become aware of the possibilities available for them to request governments to defend their industries' interests through international adjudication.
Thus, this increased communication provides the incentives and the information required for governments to bring claims to adjudication. As regards Brazil, participation in WTO litigation led to the formation of important public-private partnerships for dispute settlement,124 allowing it to successfully challenge a number of measures before WTO adjudicators, most significantly in the area of subsidies.125 Other CIFA parties are active in WTO dispute settlement as well, and this experience may prove essential in preparing them to actually resort to CIFA litigation to seek redress for violations. adjudicators. In this regard, UNCLOS dispute settlement also presents a potential model for states and investors considering resort to CIFA state-to-state dispute settlement provisions.
Conclusion
One could see CIFAs as a possible return to the pre-BITs phase of politicized investment protection. BITs, after all, aim to depoliticize investment disputes, providing investors with an instrument to counter governmental power while permitting the non-involvement of the government of the home country of the investor. As compared to the EU and Indian proposals, assessments of CIFAs that take as a starting point the desirability of ISDS-style investment protection will inevitably lead to disappointment. On the other hand, BITs have arguably focused too much on investors' rights, to the detriment of the rights of host states to regulate their economy and establish limits to investors' conduct. Those who consider that BITs have imposed overly strict restrictions on states and failed to impose obligations on investors will welcome the lack of ISDS as a means of enforcement beyond the control of home governments, and call for a strengthening of the provisions establishing obligations for investors. 132 The absence of ISDS in CIFAs does not, in and of itself, preclude the development of a significant practice of CIFA litigation. It certainly allows for a degree of political control over disputes by home states. At the same time, one may expect home states to be interested in advancing the economic interests of their nationals. The main issue then becomes whether the system of remedies established under CIFAs, seemingly inspired by WTO law, is adequate to deal with investor's claims. If it is not, CIFA adjudication may not serve the purpose of providing investors with redress, meaning that they will continue to depend on their home government not only to start proceedings but to actually obtain any meaningful redress following a victory on the merits.
Perhaps the best way to understand CIFA adjudication is by examining it in light of its stated goal, that is, to re-establish compliance with the substantive CIFA rules and, as the name of the agreements suggests, facilitate and stimulate cooperation in the field of inter-state investment. The function of CIFA adjudication is different from that fulfilled by ISDS. Rather than providing aggrieved investors with a legal instrument to leave the host country with
